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NORMATIVE, AND SOMEWHERE TO GO? 
REFLECTIONS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 
RICHARD F. DEVLIN• 
In this article the author of ers some reflections on 
professional responsibility. He straddles the optimist 
and pessimist  perspect ives espousing 
''pessoptimism" as a more adequate position than 
either extreme. The author begins by deconstructing 
the title of the conference in which the paper was 
delivered: "A New Look: A National Conference on 
the Legal Profession and Ethics," which took place 
in Calgary, in June I 994. 
Pursuing a middle path between the optimistic and 
pessimistic approaches to  professional 
responsibility, the author outlines the parameters of 
his ethical vision which provides some directions 
for legal practice. There are three elements to his 
restructured ethical vision: the "talent" of critical 
self-reflexivity, the maxim to act responsibly and the 
injunction to do no harm. 
The author draws two conclusions from his 
study: first, it is possible to talk about legal ethics 
and to outline some procedural and substantive 
ethical guidelines. Second, ethics are plural and 
diversified, contingent upon the nature of the "law 
job" involved. 
Finally, the author attempts to locate the "ethical 
triad" in the context of several different aspects of 
the legal profession; in legal education, as law 
students, lawyers, judge�. benchers and legislators. 
He suggests that the primary responsibility for 
improved legal service lies with those who are 
within the system and that legal ethics ought to be 
seen as enforceable ''public" norms. 
In conclusion, returning to the notion of 
''pessoptimism, " the author advocates an optimistic 
approach but sets out reservations and cautions. In 
the end, the author hopes that if the legal 
community cannot agree to do more good, perhaps 
ii can at least agree to do less harm. 
L 'auteur offre quelques reflexions sur la notion de 
responsabilite professionnelle. 1/ professe un certain 
«pessoptimisme», plus approprie selon lui que 
l'optimisme ou le pessimisme. II commence par 
deconstruire le titre du congres OU ii a presente son 
article. «A New Look: A national Conference on the 
Legal Profession and Ethics», qui a eu lieu a 
Calgary en juin I 994. 
Dans cette perspective intermediaire, I !auteur 
definit /es parametres de sa vision ethique et 
propose que/ques lignes directrices pour la pratique 
du droit. Cette vision ethique restructuree comprend 
trois elements : le «don» d'auto-examen critique, la 
dete,;mination d'agir de far;on responsable et 
/'obligation de ne pas nuire. 
L 'auteur tire deux conclusions de son elude 
premierement, ii est possible de par/er d'ethique 
juridique et de decrire certaines directives ethiques 
procedurales et materiel/es. Deuxiemement, 
l'ethique est p/urielle et diverse, et depend de la 
nature des ttiches juridiques concernees. 
Finalement, /'auteur tente de situer la triade 
ethique en abordant plusieurs aspects de la 
profession juridique - dans l'enseignement du 
droit, du point de vue des e/eves, des avocats, des 
juges, des membres du conseil general du barreau 
et des legislateurs. II suggere que la responsabi/ite 
d'ameliorer /es services juridiques incombe avant 
tout a ceux qui sont a l'interieur du systeme et que 
l'ethique devrait etre perr;ue a titre de normes 
publiques executoires. 
En conclusion, revenant a la notion de 
pessoptimisme, /'auteur opte pour une approche 
optimiste assortie de reserves et de mises en garde. 
L 'auteur espere que, si la communaute juridique ne 
peut pas s 'entendre pour faire plus de bien, tout au 
moins peut-elle s 'accorder pour faire mains de ma/. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
925 
On a previous occasion, several years ago, I served as a rapporteur for an 
international human rights conference hosted by the University of Calgary, and 
produced a paper entitled: "Solidarity or Solipsistic Tunnel Vision: Reminiscences of 
a Renegade Rapporteur." 1 I must have done a reasonable job, as once again, I have 
been invited to try to pull things together. On this occasion, however, I hope to be less 
contentious, less of a juvenile delinquent and to offer a report entitled: "Normative, And 
Somewhere to Go?: Reflections on Professional Responsibility."2 
To capture the essence of this report, it may be helpful to structure my comments 
around a fairly new word: pessoptimism.3 In the course of the conference there have 
been frequent references to "the cynics " or "the pessimists." These labels were attached 
to those participants who tend to be somewhat sceptical of the roles that modem 
lawyers perform, those who tend to believe that the concept of an ethically responsible 
lawyer is "oxymoronic." 4 Participants who indulge in such labelling usually do so in 
a somewhat critical and distancing way, without, however, naming or labelling their 
own perspective. It may be appropriate, at least for heuristic purposes, to conceive of 
these other participants as "the optimists." They are, in a sense, "the faithful " in that 
R. Devlin, "Solidarity or Solipsistic Tunnel Vision?: Reminiscences of a Renegade Rapporteur" 
in K. Mahoney & P. Mahoney, Human Rights in the Twenty First Century: A Global Challenge 
(Boston: M. Nijhoff, 1993) 991. 
This article is, in part, an implied critique of P. Schlag, "Normative and No Where to Go" (1990) 
43 Stan. L. Rev. 167. 
I am grateful to Alison Outhit who first suggested this neologism to me. It might also be worth 
noting that when I presented this paper at the Conference, due to my accent several members of 
the audience thought I was coining yet another "ism": "pissedoffism." Though tempting, it is a 
concept I shall leave for another occasion. 
See AC. Hutchinson, "Calgary and Everything After: A Postmodern Re-vision of Lawyering" 
(1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 768. 
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they believe in the cause of professionally responsible legal practice and they are 
sanguine about the ethical future of the legal profession. The ensuing reflections 
straddle, rather uncomfortably, these competing perspectives. Hence the neologism 
"pessoptimism." 
II. DECONSTRUCTING THE TITLE 
The title of this conference is comprised of two components, separated by a colon: 
"a new look " and "a national conference on the legal profession and ethics." Each of 
these two subcomponents can, I think, be reviewed from both an optimistic and a 
pessimistic perspective. 
A. A NEW LOOK 
The pessimists tend to conceive of the idea of "a new look " as a public relations job, 
as an attempt to provide the profession with a better image to counteract quite 
widespread public disapproval and disapprobrium about the legal profession. 5 They 
suggest that the underlying aspiration of a conference such as this is to spruce up the 
profession, to brush its hair, polish its teeth and give it a shiny new outfit. Despite ( or 
perhaps, because of) such "professional apologetics,"6 the pessimists argue that we are 
still left with the same petulant spoiled brat. In other words, all talk of a new look and 
legal ethics is but a legitimation strategy designed to offset a negative image generated 
by several recent high profile scandals (for example, the Lang Michener case), scandals 
that could endanger the monopoly position of the profession. 7 
Optimists are reluctant to adopt such an approach. 8 They conceive of the phrase "a 
new look" not so much as an attempt to rectify an image problem, but rather as a 
process of revision. From an optimistic perspective, the ambition of a conference of this 
nature is to re-think, re-analyze and re-interpret the assumptions and norms of legal 
practice in all its forms. The suggestion is that perhaps we have been somewhat lax on 
See e.g. the proposed role statement of the L.S.U.C. reproduced in C. Curtis, "Alternative Visions 
of the Legal Profession in Society: A Perspective on Ontario" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 787; J. 
Watson Hamilton, "Metaphors of Lawyers' Professionalism" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 833; J. Jaff, 
"Law and Lawyers in Pop Music: A Reason for Self-Reflection" (1986) 40 U. Miami L. Rev. 659. 
There are also indications of dissatisfaction with the practice of law within the profession. See e.g. 
A. Altman, "Modem Litigators and Lawyer Statesmen" (1994) 103 Yale L.J. 1031 at 1033; G. 
Giesel, "The Business Client is a Woman: The Effect of Women as In-House Counsel on Women 
in Law Firms and the Legal Profession" (1993) 72 Nebr. L. Rev. 760 at 783-86. 
W. Pue, "In Pursuit of Better Myth: Lawyers History and History of Lawyers" (1995) 33 Alta. L. 
Rev. 730 at 734. 
R. Abel, "Toward a Political Economy of Lawyers" (1981) Wis. L. Rev. 1117; H. Arthurs, 
"Climbing Kilimanjaro: Ethics for Postmodern Professionals" (1993) 6:1 Westminster Affairs 3 
at 6; G. MacKenzie, "Lawyer Discipline and the Independence of the Bar: Can Lawyers Still 
Govern Themselves?" (1990) 24 L. Soc. Gaz. 319; G. MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics: 
Professional Responsibility and Discipline (Toronto: Carswell, 1993); Pue, supra note 6; B. 
Wilson, "Pressing Ethical Questions Facing the Legal Profession" (1993) 6: I Westminster Affairs 
80. 
M. Somerville, "Applying Ethical Standards to Lawyers" (1993) 6:1 Westminster Affairs 11 at 12, 
14. 
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issues of legal ethics, but that time has now come to re-orient the profession. This 
approach is optimistic in the sense that it believes that reform and transformation of the 
legal profession are possible. Thus, for example, we have MacKenzie's affirmation of 
the impending detailed code in Alberta,9 Garant's celebration of the new protocol on 
interjurisdictional practice and its suggested "innovative ethics" provisions, 10 the 
proposed role statement of the L.S.U.C., 11 and the call by Mr. Justice Major for more 
pro bono work.12 
B. A NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TIIE LEGAL PROFESSION AND ETHICS 
In my opinion, probably the most significant word in the latter part of the title is 
"ethics." While the conference organizers obviously put a great deal of effort into 
convening a forum open to a variety of perspectives on the legal profession and ethics 
- perspectives informed by legal history, 13 legal theory, 14 personal experiences of 
discrimination and marginalization15 and official status within professional 
organizations 16 - I was quite disappointed that not a lot of attention was focused 
upon what is meant by "ethics." By and large the tendency was to consider the meaning 
and parameters of "ethics" to be uncontroversial and to proceed without caution. 17 As 
a partial corrective to this discursive lacuna, it may be helpful to develop some tentative 
thoughts on what ethics might mean and to locate some of the debates that have 
occurred during the conference in the context of these reflections on ethics. Once again 
the pessimism/optimism dichotomy may serve as a helpful lens through which to filter 
these propositions. 
Pessimists tend to be wary of ethics talk on both an epistemological and pragmatic 
level. Epistemological pessimists tend to conceive of ethics as a cognate of some 
JO 
II 
12 
13 
14 
IS 
16 
17 
G. MacKenzie, "The Valentine's Card in the Operating Room: Codes of Ethics and the Family 
Ideals �f the Legal Profession" ( 199S) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 8S9. 
P. Garant, "A Reactionary Looks to the Future" (Address to A New Look: A National Conference 
on the Legal Profession and Ethics, Calgary 10 June 1994) [unpublished]. 
Curtis, supra note S. 
J.C. Major, "Lawyer's Obligation to Provide Legal Services" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 719. But see 
contra B. Ballman Jr., "Amended Rule 6.1: Another Move Towards Mandatory Pro Bono? Is That 
What We Want?" (1994) 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 1139; S. Bretz, ''Why Mandatory Pro Bono is a 
Bad Idea" (1990) 3 Geo. J. of Legal Ethics 623. 
Pue, supra note 6: 
Hamilton, supra note S. 
0. Pothier, "On Not 'Getting It"' (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 817. 
D. McCawley, Address on "Regulation of the Profession" (A New Look: A National Conference 
on the Legal Profession and Ethics, Calgary 10 June 1994) [unpublished]. 
There is, of course, an extensive literature on the nature and function of legal ethics. See e.g. D. 
Luban, ed., The Good Lawyer: Lawyers' Roles and Lawyers' Ethics (Totowa, NJ.: Rowman & 
Allanheld, 1983); D. Luban, lawyers and Justice: An Ethical Study (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1988); T. Shaffer, On Being a Christian Lawyer (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young 
University Press, 1981 ); T. Shaffer, American Lawyers and their Communities: Ethics in the Legal 
Profession (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991). For a brief introductory 
overview, see C. Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics (St. Paul Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1986) at 
68-78. 
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universalizing truth.18 Drawing on the insights of philosophical relativism, they tend 
to dismiss the possibility of Truth - with a capital T - and concomitantly the 
possibility of ethical discourse. 19 Pragmatic pessimists tend to look to either history 
or sociology and argue that what is important in structuring legal practice is not an 
idealist regime of "ethics" but materially driven structural forces.20 
Optimists, unsurprisingly, are unwilling fo totally abandon the language of ethics. For 
some, legal ethics may be conceived of as a very precise set of rules or codes of 
conduct that, like rules of law, can provide guidance for proper action in specific 
situations.21 Mimicking the common law regime, the governing ideal of this 
perspective is essentially one of inductive logic, and so, in a sense, the more detailed 
and precise the rules, the better. 22 An alternative optimistic approach is to consider 
ethics to be a universalizing and generalizing mode of reflection which, with the 
appropriate application of deductive logic, can provide guidance on how to proceed in 
moments of doubt. It is thought that the articulation of general principles can provide 
a structure of reflection and understanding that can be adopted to precise situations of 
moral complexity.23 
At this point I want to temporarily bypass the arguments of the pessimists (though 
I will return to them in due course) to propose that each of the foregoing optimistic 
approaches - the inductive and the deductive - potentially have something to offer 
as we discuss the possibility of ethics for the legal profession. 24 More specifically, I 
IR 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Hutchinson, supra note 4. 
Schlag, supra note 2. 
H. Arthurs, "The Dead Parrot: Does Professional Self Regulation Exhibit Vital Signs?" (1995) 33 
Alta. L. Rev. 800; Arthurs, supra note 7; Pue, supra note 6. 
F. Zacharias, "Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice and the Paradigm 
of Prosecutorial Ethics" (1993) 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 223. 
See Law Society of Alberta, Code of Professional Conduct (Calgary: Law Society of Alberta, 
1995) [hereinafter Alberta Code]. 
As Law points out, this is very much the approach adopted by the ABA Canons of Ethics 1908, 
and CBA Canons of Legal Ethics 1920. J. Law, "A Code for All Reasons: The 1908 ABA and 
1920 CBA Codes of Conduct in Retrospect" (Address to A New Look: A National Conference on 
the Legal Profession and Ethics, Calgary IO June 1994) [unpublished). One American commentator 
outlines the following six "principles": 
I. Honesty. Don't steal. Bill fairly. 
2. Candor. Tell the truth. Explain the significance of things. 
3. Competence. Know what you are doing and do it well. 
4. Diligence. Work hard and stick to it. 
5. Loyalty. Use your independent professional judgment. Don't allow your own interests 
or the interests of others to divert, dilute, or diminish your efforts. 
6. Discretion. Don't gossip. Don't reveal confidential infonnation. 
M. Bayles, Professional Ethics (Delmont, Calif.: Wadsworth Publishing Co., 1981). For a helpful 
overview of some of the different moral traditions that might be invoked, see S. Sherwin, No 
Longer Patient: Feminist Ethics and Health Care (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992) 
at 35-42. 
See also G. MacKenzie, supra note 9; and Nussbaum, who calls for "a conception of equitable 
judgment that is historically situated, responsive to particular circumstances, and yet committed 
to general nonns of justice." in M. Nussbaum, "Scepticism about Practical Reason in Literature 
and the Law" (1994) 107 Harv. L. Rev. 714 at 743. 
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think that there are two basic points to be made: first, ethical thought is best conceived 
of as pluralist and context sensitive; second, ethical commitment entails a belief in 
political correctness. 
To elaborate: on occasion, some commentators suggest that there is such a thing as 
a professional legal ethic that encompasses several specific virtues such as honour, 
honesty, integrity, loyalty and neutrality. 25 Such an approach advocates a singular 
model of the legal professional persona. However, as several participants have argued, 
the legal profession is neither monolithic nor homogeneous; it is demographically 
diverse,26 stratified in its tasks, and pluralistic iri its functions. 27 Given these 
sociological realities, 28 it seems to me that it is more appropriate to abandon singular 
(and therefore restrictive) modes of analysis and to approach ethics from the bottom up 
rather than from the top down. In other words, what is required is a contextual and 
pluralist conception of legal ethics, one that is contingent upon the nature of the 
particular "law jobs " in which. a lawyer finds her or himself. 29 Thus, questions of 
ethical conduct will depend upon whether one is acting as a litigator or as a counsellor, 
in a criminal context or a civil context, in an educational role or a representative role. 
Much might also depend upon how sophisticated a client might be, whether she or he 
is a "first timer " or a corporate "repeat player." 30 Alberta seems to have moved in the 
direction of this complex, multi-tiered and contextually-sensitive approach.3 1 
This point about a pluralistic and contextual approach to ethics is helpful in that it 
is potentially more pragmatic than the singular and abstracting approach. 32 However, 
while it is procedurally useful insofar as it locates ethically reflective thought, it 
provides little substantive guidance as to how one is to do the right thing. For some, 
the answer is obvious: the lawyer should not abuse or take advantage of his or her 
client in whichever of the contexts one operates. My own view, however, is that such 
a mantra is both simplistic and inadequate. While it provides a necessary component 
for professionally responsible conduct, it is not sufficient. Ethics, I suggest, is about 
"right living " in all aspects of one's professional life. More precisely, ethical legal 
practice has both an internal and an external dimension. 
The external dimension is quite obvious: it addresses questions about how one is to 
relate to one 's client. As an advisor to, and representative of, one's client, the lawyer 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
JO 
3 1  
32 
AD. Hunter, "A View as to the Profile of a Lawyer in Private Practice" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 
831. 
Report of the C.B.A. Task Force on Gender Equality in the Legal Profession, Touchstones for 
Change: Equality, Diversity and Accountability (Ottawa: Canadian Bar Association, 1993) 
[hereinafter Touchstones]. 
Arthurs, supra note 20; Curtis, supra note 5; Hutchinson, supra note 4. 
See more generally R. Abel & P. Lewis, Lawyers in Society: The Common Law World (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988). 
MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics, supra note 7 at 3; S. Sponkin, "The Need for Separate Codes of 
Professional Conduct for the Various Specialities" (1993) 7 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 149. 
D. Wilkins, "Who Should Regulate Lawyers?" (1992) 105 Harv. L. Rev. 801 at 816-17. 
Alberta Code, supra note 22. 
Sherwin, supra note 23 at 53, 77. 
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should act as a good faith agent. 33 Now, while this is the familiar realm of 
professional responsibility, it is not easy to provide solutions to commonplace problems 
such as disclosure of confidential information, 34 conflict of interest scenarios 35 or 
more controversial issues such as cross-examination of a complainant in sexual assault 
situations or whistle blowing. 36 
The internal dimension is less obvious in the sense that, historically, it has not been 
conceived of as an issue of professional ethics. Basically, the internal dimension 
addresses the question of the lawyer's relationship with others with whom he or she 
comes into contact in his or her professional role. It asks: how do I, as a lawyer, treat 
my clients, my colleagues, my employees? Are the norms and mores of my professional 
interaction premised upon, and enforcing of, attitudes that are dominating and 
exploitative?37 In other words, it asks: do I contribute to an environment in which, 
inter alia, classism, racism, sexism, homophobia and abilism are accepted and 
tolerated?38 More challenging still, it forces us to consider whether we are aware of the 
interaction of different forms of domination and exclusion.39 For example, what efforts 
do we pursue in attempting to understand and respond to the specific circumstances of 
a disabled woman or a gay First Nations person? 
For some, this turn to an internal interrogation of professional norms and mores may 
go too far. It may be understood as being a form of moralistic interventionism or even 
political correctness.40 It may be perceived and construed as an unwarranted 
infringement of the rights of the autonomous lawyer to exercise his or her free choice 
to run a practice as she or he might wish.41 In short, some might claim that such an 
expanded conception of "professional responsibility " renders the phenomenon 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
B. Smith, Professional Conduct for Canadian Lawyers (Toronto: Butterworths, 1989). 
See e.g. G. Grenier, "Solicitor-Client Privilege and the Ontario Loan and Trust Corporations Act" 
(1989) 1 5  Can. Bus. L.J. 129. 
G. Steele, "Imputing Knowledge from One Member of a Firm to Another: 'Lead us Not into 
Temptation"' ( 1991)  12  Advocates Q. 46; P. Moser, "Chinese Walls: A Means of Avoiding Law 
Firm Disqualification When a Personally Disqualified Lawyer Joins the Firm" (l  990) 3 Geo. J. 
Legal Ethics 399. MacKenzie proposes that detailed rules should be adopted to provide lawyers 
with guidance in such issues (Lawyers and Ethics, supra note 7). See also Wolfram, supra note 
17, C. 6, 7, 8. 
R. Cramton, "The Lawyer as Whistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer" (1991) 
S Geo. J. Legal Ethics 291 ;  Wolfram, ibid. at 666. 
For discussions of this point, see M. Harrington, Women Lawyers: Rewriting the Rules (New York: 
A.A. Knopf, 1994). 
W. Baker, "Structµre of the Workplace or Should we Continue to Knock the Comers off the 
Square Pegs or Can we Change the Shape of the Holes?" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 82 1 ;  Curtis, 
supra note S; MacKenzie, Lawyers and Ethics, supra note 7 at 25-24; Touchstones, supra note 26. 
Pothier, supra note 1 5 ;  Touchstones, ibid. 
My own view is that, despite the reactionary rhetoric, it is both acceptable and desirable to be 
politically correct, particularly if one is a lawyer. It seems to me that as professionals who seek 
to connect ourselves to justice we should seek to do the correct thing - and to take proper 
political stances to support our moral vision. Who, in good conscience, would want to act against 
their moral principles? Literally, why would you want to do the wrong thing, or be politically 
incorrect? 
Curtis, supra note S. 
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unrecognizable. Others may invoke the familiar refrain that academics may be good at 
critique but have little to offer by way of alternatives. 
In response to these concerns, the next section will outline the parameters of an 
ethical vision that, in my opinion, provides some direction for legal practice. 
III. RECONSTRUCTING LEGAL ETHICS 
The reconstructive ethical vision advanced in this section is comprised of three basic 
elements: the "talent" of critical self-reflexivity; the maxim to act responsibly; and the 
injunction to do no harm 42 - each of which can provide an angle on some of the 
presentations and debates that have occurred in the course of this conference. 
A. PRINCIPLE OF CRITICAL SELF-REFLEXIVITY 
As human beings who seek to do our jobs, to operate efficiently, to make a living 
and to sleep at night, we necessarily have a vested interest in believing that we are 
doing the right thing. However, at times there is danger of complacency, passivity, and 
routinization that can lead to "conceptual limitations of vision,"43 or a sort of moral 
numbness. Certain patterns of professional conduct are so taken for granted that they 
may become entrenched and, therefore, unquestionable. 
The principle of critical self-reflexivity works on the assumption that nothing is 
infallible and that everything is potentially up for grabs.44 It serves as a sort of ethical 
"pin prick" and encourages each of us to become conscious of the particular, partial, 
partisan and necessarily incomplete nature of our own self-perceptions. The principle 
of critical self-reflexivity suggests that each of us should do a "double take " on our 
assumptions, beliefs and conduct, to consider what possible gaps or failures might 
permeate our thinking and our practices. In other words, it demands that we build into 
both our analyses and conduct processes of ongoing self-recognition and that we foster 
a stronger disposition for humility and a greater openness to possible criticisms. An 
example might be that we advocates of the adversarial common law system could 
42 
43 
44 
Others have also discussed aspects of each of these ideas but none, I think, have put them together 
in quite the same way as I suggest. See e.g. S. Allegretti, "Shooting Elephants, Serving Clients: 
An Essay on George Orwell and the Lawyer-Client Relationship" (1993) Creighton L. Rev. l ;  N. 
Cahn, "A Preliminary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics" (1990) 4 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 23; D. 
Kennedy, "The Responsibility of Lawyers for the Justice of their Causes" ( l  987) 18 Tex. Tech. 
L. Rev. 1157; M. Nussbaum, supra note 24; S. Pepper, "Autonomy, Community and Lawyers' 
Ethics" (1990) 19 Capital U. L. Rev. 939; D. Rhode, "Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice" 
(1985) 37 Stan. L. Rev. 589; W. Simon, "The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and 
Professional Ethics" (1978) Wis. L. Rev. 30; W. Simon, "Ethical Discretion in Lawyering" (1988) 
101 Harv. L. Rev. 1083. 
See Pothier, supra note 15. 
See generally R.M. Unger, Social Theory, its Situation and its Task (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987). 
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consider backing off from imposing our culturally specific legal norms and processes 
on First Nations peoples. 45 
More schematically, the principle of critical self-reflexivity might operate at both the 
macro and micro levels of the Canadian legal system. For example, at the macro level 
it might engender the following sorts of questions: is the practice of law complicitous 
in, or legitimizing of, patterns of inequality in Canadian society? Specifically, who 
tends to get access to law school, law jobs, and the "pick of the crop" opportunities 
within the profession?46 Are the assumptions that underpin contemporary legal practice 
as secure as we have traditionally believed? For example, is the adversarial model 
necessarily the most desirable route to follow given the radical diversity of legal 
problems in modem society?47 Are the traditional norms and standards for the 
evaluation of the legal profession sufficient to meet the needs of contemporary 
Canadian society? Do we need supplementary norms such as the desiderata of greater 
inclusion and the minimization of inequality?48 Do we have an equitable distribution 
of legal resources in Canadian society?49 Have there been information or market 
failures or negative externalities that have resulted in a dysfunctional or inefficient 
allocation of our legal wealth?50 If so, what sort of correctives can be developed? Is 
self-regulation by a monopoly really defensible on principled, practical or historical 
grounds?51 
If all of these concerns seem to be so grand as to be imponderable, perhaps we can 
adopt the environmentalist slogan "think globally, act locally" to consider the 
application of the principle of self-reflexivity at the micro level of legal practice. First, 
this might suggest that each of us should consider the way in which the privilege of 
legal knowledge confers upon us social power. In tum, we might then want to question 
whether we use that dynamic of power/knowledge appropriately when we work with 
45 
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49 
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L. Chartrand, "The Appropriateness of the Lawyer as Advocate in  Contemporary Aboriginal 
Justice Initiatives" (1995) 33 Alta. L. Rev. 874. See also D. Kleinberger, "Wanted: An Ethos of 
Personal Responsibility - Why Codes of Ethics and Schools of Law Don't Make for Ethical 
Lawyers" (1989)  21 Con. L. Rev. 365 at 367-68, for a review of the criticisms of the adversarial 
model more generally. 
Giesel, supra note 5, reviews the extensive American literature raising these concerns. In the 
Canadian context, · see C. Tennant, "Discrimination in the Legal Profession, Codes of Professional 
Conduct and the Duty of Non-Discrimination" (1992) 1 5  Dalhousie L.J. 464; Touchstones, supra 
note 26. 
D. Ginn, "Wife Assault, the Justice System and Professional Responsibility" (1995) 33 Alta. L. 
Rev. 908; Simon, "Ideology," supra note 42. 
J. Dooley & E. Wood, "Opening the Courthouse Door: The Americans with Disabilities Act's 
Impact on the Courts" (June-July 1992) 76  Jud. 39; Pothier, supra note I 5; Touchstones, supra 
note 26. 
See Major, supra note 1 2. 
D. Rhode, "Why the ABA Bothers: A Functional Perspective on Professional Codes" (1981) 59 
Tex. L. Rev. 689 at 7 1 6. 
Arthurs, supra note 20; Rhode, ibid. at 7 1 8; B. Stephenson, "The Social Contract of a Self 
Governing Profession" (1980) 1 4  L. Soc. Gaz. 255: 
J 
NORMATIVE, AND SOMEWHERE TO GO? 933 
our clients or whether we use it as a way to dominate them.52 Moreover, the principle 
of critical self-reflexivity might encourage us to reconsider the norms of our work 
environments and the particular roles that we find ourselves in as partners, associates, 
judges, clerks, students, professors, employees, employers and colleagues. 
It is, of course, always easier to espouse the principle of self-reflexivity than it is to 
embrace it. To incorporate self-reflexivity into our lives and practices is a profound 
challenge. On one level, many of us are so busy that we cannot imagine second­
guessing our normal assumptions because the result, we fear, might be chaos. On 
another level, it is painful to be told that individually and as a profession we are elitist, 
racist, abilist, classist and sexist. It is disturbing to realize that one's chosen profession 
may be part of the problem, when all along we thought that we were part of the 
solution.53 It is simply too exhausting to lose sleep at night pondering these questions 
when we have been hosting some potential clients for dinner and our daybook indicates 
a 7:00 a.m. power breakfast for the next morning. However, it seems to me that if one 
genuinely aspires to be more than a mere technical automaton or to have any pretence 
of being involved in a profession that holds itself out as closely connected to justice, 
then the principle of critical self-reflexivity is a minimal moral imperative. 
In short, the principle of critical self-reflexivity is supplementary in that it advocates 
different analyses, focuses on different problems and frequently proposes different 
answers from those generated by conventional wisdom about professional 
responsibility.54 In a sense, it can be understood as a form of consciousness-raising 
and, as such, it destabilizes our "right not to know."55 Most importantly, the principle 
of critical self-reflexivity encourages us to reconsider the power that we as a profession 
possess. It helps us to remember that the professional is the political. 
B. ACT RESPONSIBLY 
While the principle of critical self-reflexivity may serve as a minimal moral 
imperative, it is, I fear, excessively procedural and therefore a little too minimal. One 
may practice critical self-reflexivity and still decide to act in what I would suggest is 
an unethical way. All that critical self-reflexivity would achieve is an awareness of the 
significance of one's acts. Changed consciousness is not chan_ged circumstances. 
52 
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Chartrand, supra note 45; Hutchinson, supra note 4; G. Lo pez, Rebellious Lawyering: One 
Chicano 's Vision of Progressive Law Practice (Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press , 1992); Pepper, 
supra note 42 at 949, 955; D. Rosenthal, Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge? ( New York: 
Russell Sape Foundation, 1 974). Sexual relations with a client are an obvious example. 
I t  should be pointed out, however, that unlike many other professions, the legal community is at 
leas t asking questions about discrimination in the profession, and in this sense can be seen to be 
manifes ting some of the virtues of self-reflexivity. See e.g. Touchstones, supra note 26. 
Several commentators have sugges ted that female lawyers tend to have a different moral vision 
than male lawyers .  See e.g. R. Jack & D. Crowley Jack, Moral Vision and Professional Decisions: 
The Changing Values of Women and Men Lawyers (Cambridge: Cambridge Univers ity Press, 
1989); C. Menkel-Meadow, " Portia in a Different Voice: Some Speculations on a Women's 
Lawyering Process" (1985) I Berkeley Women's L.J. 39. 
B. Feldthusen, "The Gender Wars : 'Where the Boys Are"' (1990) 4 Can. J. Women & L. 66 at 
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Therefore, I would argue that the principle of critical self-reflexivity also needs to be 
supplemented with some substantive content: the proposition to act responsibly. 
As North American lawyers, we are ensconced in a tradition that puts a very high 
value on individualism, liberty and freedom. More specifically, there is a tendency to 
priorize rights thinking and to encode much social interaction and conflict in a rights 
discourse. In the context of this conference, two aspects of rights thinking may be 
pertinent: clients' rights and lawyers' rights. 
The idea of client's rights dovetails with the lawyerly ethos of zealous 
representation.56 That is, conventional professional wisdom argues that the client (as 
principal) has absolute priority and that it is the duty of the lawyer (as agent) to 
represent that client to the full extent of her or his capacities without, however, either 
in perception or reality, ever actually identifying with that particular client. The 
assumptions underlying "this Principle of Nonaccountability"57 are threefold: first, that 
client autonomy is the paradigm value;58 second, that judgments by lawyers in relation 
to a client are both premature and partisan; and third, that distance is essential to ensure 
rational conduct.59 The result, to put it crassly, is the "hired gun,"60 or to be more 
polite, the "neutral partisanship." 61 
The idea of lawyers' rights arises out of a commingling of at least two assumptions: 
the belief that a lawyer, like everyone else, has a right to make a living doing what she 
or he does best;62 and the idea that the protection of such a lawyerly right serves the 
public good of ensuring that everyone will have access to legal representation, because 
lawyers will not be unwilling to represent "unpopular " clients. 63 
There is no doubt that rights discourse is an important social achievement and that 
arguments in favour of both lawyers' and clients ' rights carry a great deal of weight. 
However, we must be careful not to get carried away with the rhetoric of rights. An 
excessive emphasis on rights can induce a form of professional tunnel vision. 
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See e.g. Law Society of Alberta, Professional Conduct Handbook (Calgary: Law Society of 
Alberta, 1983) at 27: 
When acting as an advocate the lawyer must, while treating the tribunal with courtesy 
and respect, represent his [sic] client resolutely, honourably, and within the limits of the 
law. 
See also J. Law, supra note 23 for a further discussion of the idea of zealous representation. 
Murray Schwartz has probably stated this position most succinctly: "When acting as an advocate ... 
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achieved." M. Schwartz, "The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers" (1978) 66 Cal. L. 
Rev. 669 at 673. 
S. Pepper, "The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defence, A Problem, and Some Possibilities" 
(1986) Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 6 13 . 
Kleinberger, supra note 45. at 370-7 1 .  
M. Freedman, "The Lawyer as a Hired Gun" in A. Gerson, ed., Lawyer's Ethics: Contemporary 
Dilemmas (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Inc., 1980) 63. 
Rhode, supra note 42 at 605; Simon, "Ideology," supra note 42 at 36-37. 
Rhode, ibid. at ·6 10. 
Major, supra note 1 2. Rhode, however, argues that in the American context the legal profession 
has repeatedly failed to represent unpopular causes. Rhode, ibid. at 630. 
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Specifically, by exclusively highlighting the lawyer-client relationship, the broader 
context in which we as a profession operate may be obscured, rendering our conduct 
disconnected from the broader community. 64 
To my mind, the practice of law is not a right; rather it is a socially conferred 
privilege. To be a lawyer is to be a trustee not just for the interests of individual clients, 
but also for the interests of the broader society. If this is so, greater attention must be 
focused on the responsible fulfilment of this socially conferred trust. Consequently, it 
is not adequate to fetishize rights to justify a "my hands are clean" argument. Rather, 
as public trustees, lawyers must recognize their social responsibilities and be 
accountable for their conduct.65 Thus, as we perform our various legal practices, not 
only must we ask the unavoidable question of what the client's rights are, but also the 
parallel question of what the ramifications of our conduct and strategies are for the 
broader society. Lawyers who advise clients on environmental issues might be an 
obvious example as might criminal defence lawyers in sexual assault trials. 
C. DO NO HARM 
While the proposition to act responsibly adds some substantive bite to the principle 
of critical self-reflexivity, it is still too abstracted. Therefore, as a third side to this 
ethical triad I would suggest that lawyers consider the maxim: do no harm with your 
legal skills or in the operation of your legal practice. 
On one level this would easily translate into the banal imperative to do no harm to 
your client: pay attention to your job, don't over-bill, maintain confidences and don't 
steal the trust funds. A more ambitious, expansive and controversial application of the 
maxim would, however, counsel that lawyers should not use their legal skills to harm 
others in society, beyond their clients.66 This would mean that, while lawyers have a 
responsibility to pursue the interests of their clients, they cannot go so far that their 
conduct would cause harm to others. The challenge of such a maxim becomes obvious 
when it is counterposed with one of the classic statements of the lawyer' s  role, Lord 
Brougham's proposition in the Queen Caroline divorce trial, that: 
An advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is 
his client. To serve that client by all means and expedients and all hazards and costs to other persons, 
and among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty, he must not regard 
the alarm, the torments and the destruction which he may bring upon others.[sic)61 
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Major, ibid. 
M. Eberts, "Representing Unpopular Interests in the 1990s" (1993 Wickwire Lecture, Dalhousie 
Law School, 1 5  November 1993) [unpublished]; Hutchinson, supra note 4. 
E. Torphy-Donzella, "Products Liability Litigation and Third Party Harm: The Ethics of 
Nondisclosure" (1991) 5 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 435 provides one forum for a discussion of such an 
idea. 
G. Hazard, Jr. & 0. Rhode, The Legal Profession: Responsibility and Regulation, 3d ed. 
(Westburg, N.Y.: The Foundation Press, 1994) at" 136-37 [emphasis added). 
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This expansive and inclusive conception of "do no harm " is premised on the idea that, 
as social beings and citizens, we are part of an interdependent web of relationships that 
generates responsibilities to others beyond those with whom we directly interact. This 
principle of non-maleficence68 suggests that we should be more empathetic in our 
practices to recognize that we owe a duty of care not just to our clients, but also to 
others who we can reasonably foresee will be harmed by our practices. To the extent 
that the proposition "do no harm " is tortious and communitarian ·  rather than 
contractualist and individualistic, it may prompt us towards "compassionate immersion 
and non-indifference. "69 
To be clear, however, this is not an attempt to impose a "stifling despotism of 
virtue "70 where "mercenaries for hire " are transformed into "missionaries for 
justice. "71 It is not proposed that lawyers put other interests ahead of their clients' . 
Rather the proposition is more modest : work in your client 's best interest but only up 
to the threshold of not harming others. It is not an invocation to do good; it is an 
exhortation not to do wrong.72 
68 
69 
70 
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72 
Tosh Hayashi has brought this way of phrasing the issue to my attention. 
Nussbaum, supra note 24 at 744. 
R.M. Unger, "The Critical Legal Studies Movement" (1986) 103 Harv. L. Rev. 561 at 641. 
Rhode, supra note 42 at 632. 
Negotiation strategies might be a fruitful area of analysis. See e.g. T. Guernsey, "Truthfulness in 
Negotiation" (1982) 17 U. Richmond L. Rev. 99. An obvious response to this suggesti9n is that 
not every lawyer will adopt such a stance, and that those who are less ethically motivated will 
service those clients who want a "hired gun," thereby free-riding in this new "ethical economy." 
Gordon and Simon identify this potential problem and respond to it in the following manner: 
Here the image is of a "race to the bottom" in which moral entrepreneurs 
will undercut others in a competitive process that will push standards down 
to their least common denominator. 
To the extent that clients shop for lawyers in terms of their willingness to 
do the clients' bidding, there is some reality to this view. But to the extent 
that clients value high ethical standards in lawyers, the view ignores 
countervailing pressures. Clients might value high ethical standards in 
lawyers because they themselves have such standards and prefer to associate 
with people who share their views. They may value high standards because 
they believe such standards are associated with an especially sophisticated 
type of legal judgment that is less likely to sacrifice the client's long-term 
interests to short-term gain. They may value them because association with 
lawyers with a reputation for high standards lends the client valuable status 
or credibility with third parties with whom the client has to deal. 
If high standards have economic value in this sense, lawyers have practical 
reasons to institutionalize them through organizations like bar associations 
and to give them credibility by conferring powers to certify and enforce 
them on such associations. Thus, one might imagine a "race to the top" in 
which entrepreneurs make their services more attractive by associating them 
with a credible reputation for high ethical standards, thus creating 
competitive pressures for others to follow suit. As more lawyers follow suit, 
association with those who do not will carry an increasingly costly stigma 
that deters clients and marginalizes this type of practice. Of course, this 
vision is no more plausible than the "race to the bottom." It seems likely that 
any market for legal services will involve pressures pushing ethical standards 
in many directions. The point is that these conflicting pressures may leave 
ambitious lawyers some room for institutional innovation that furthers their 
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IV. LOCATING LEGAL ETHICS 
I think that the foregoing review suggests two things: first, that it is possible to talk 
about ethics and to outline some procedural and substantive ethical guidelines; and 
second, that ethics are plural and diversified, contingent upon the nature of the law job 
involved. In this section, I will attempt to .locate the ethical triad of "critical self­
reflexivity, " "responsibility " and "do no harm " in the context of several different aspects 
of the legal profession, while drawing upon several of the presentations and debates that 
have surfaced in the last few days. A connecting theme for the ensuing suggestions is 
that ethical lawyering is like a muscle: it can be toned through regular exercise, or it 
can atrophy through disuse.73 
A. LEGAL EDUCATION 
Legal education, not only in law schools but also in the form of CLE, is an obvious 
and important location for a consideration of questions of professional responsibility.74 · 
There are, of course, the debates about what is the best way to structure professional 
responsibility courses and the contentious question of whether or not they should be 
mandatory.75 But I think it is important to emphasize that legal educators need to 
conceive of professional responsibility expansively and critically and not just to 
consider it as a forced march through codes of conduct. For example, as teachers we 
must emphasize that much professional misconduct is not just moral laxity, but a form 
of white collar crime. Moreover, as professors, we have to take responsibility for 
questions of access to legal education,76 for what we choose to teach and for what we 
choose not to teach, 77 for how we teach and the ways we create safer or more hostile 
73 
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This theme is sugges ted, indirec tly , by D. Kennedy, "Rebels from Princ iple: Changing the 
Corporate Law Firm from Within" (Fall 1981) Harvard Law School Bulletin 36 at 39. While 
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abilis t. Having discussed it with several colleagues,  I don't think it is , but I am not completely 
sure. Therefore, because I believe it is a helpful metaphor, I have dec ided to use it. 
W. Cotter, Professional Responsibility Instruction in Canada: A Coordinated Curriculum for Legal 
Education (Montreal: Conceptcom, 1992 ). 
A. Esau, "Teaching Professional Responsibility in Law School" (1988) 11 Dalhousie L.J. 403. 
R. Devlin, "Towards An/other Legal Education: Some Tentative Critical and Tentative Proposals 
to Confront the Racism of Modem Legal Education" (1989) 38 U.N.B.L.J. 89; R. Devlin & A.W. 
MacKay, "An Essay on Institutional Responsibility: The Indigenous Black and Micmac Programme 
at Dalhous ie Law School" (1 991 ) 14 Dalhousie L.J. 296; Touchstones, supra note 26. 
For example, in conjunc tion with the IBM programme, Dalhousie Law School has set in place a 
process of course revision to ensure that our teaching materials are more inc lusive of diversity. 
Many professors have not attempted to incorporate such materials . I t  should also be noted that 
some of these materials, the point of which was to address rac ial discrimination, were reproduced 
in  a barely legible way therefore making them quite inaccessible to visually impaired s tudents . 
This poignant example of "s till not getting it" was brought to my attention by Professor D. Pothier. 
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environments, 78 and for the implicit messages which we convey through our 
teaching.79 Furthermore, law teachers might want to consider making it a requirement 
that students fulfil some public service prior to graduation. 80 The desired aim 
throughout, I would suggest, is to be prophylactic: to help students identify problematic 
assumptions and practices, not so much to create moral fibre (for that is an impossible 
task) but to encourage a environment hospitable to its growth. My colleague Wayne 
MacKay dealt with some of these issues more eloquently than 1.81 
B. LAW STUDENTS 
Many of the debates around professional responsibility tend to treat students as 
objects of discussion and therefore as essentially passive. Students, however, are active 
members of the legal community and also have much to contribute to the questions of 
professional responsibility. Two comments are all that I have time for in this report. 
First, it seems to me that it is important for students to realize that legal education is 
a social privilege and not an (inherited) right. One consequence of this could be that 
"mainstream students" might cease their complaining about the unfairness of "equity" 
initiatives at many Canadian law schools. Second, although times are tough, law 
students still represent a very privileged and quite . "marketable" sub-community. This 
enables law students as a group to have some social power and to consider whether 
they can exercise that power in an ethically responsible way. To take one example, 
during the late 1 980s, elite law students in the United States boycotted a major law firm 
because it was the legal representative of South African Airlines. The strategy 
contributed to the firm terminating its relationship with the South African 
government.82 Could such a campaign be organized in relation to equity issues in 
Canada, given the fact that many private law firms are refusing to even open the door? 
C. LAWYERS 
Lawyers, as both members of a professional community and individuals, obviously 
encounter many ethical questions. As a community, a collective commitment could be 
made to allocate a specific amount of our resources to pro bono work,83 or we could 
accept the LSUC proposed rule on non-discrimination. 84 As individuals, we could 
78 
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Alta. L. Rev. 920. 
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reconsider how we run our daily practices to analyze the ways in which we are 
exclusive and dominating. As potential remedies, we might encourage employment 
equity and mentoring as possibilities.85 We might also want to rethink the ways in 
which we interact with our clients. Instead of considering them as merely fountains for 
billable hours, we could encourage them to pursue self-help and empowerment rather 
than dependence. Or, we could drop the pretence of "agnosticism" and "studied 
neutrality"86 and suggest to clients that, while what they propose to do would be legal, 
it would be "conduct unbecoming" a lawyer to pursue such a strategy as it harms other 
members of society.87 Finally, if we are in relatively senior positions in a law firm (for 
example, a partner), we could promote procedures to recognize and value the pro bona 
efforts of the lawyers who work with us,88 or implement parental leave policies and 
flexible work schedules.89 
D. JUDGES 
Judges, as the elite of the profession, are particularly well situated to provide ethical 
leadership. They could accept that bias does in fact exist in the court system 90 and 
embrace rather than trash judicial education programs that are designed to promote 
equity in the legal system.91 Moreover, as leaders of the profession, they could 
acknowledge rather than deny that on occasion there is inappropriate judicial conduct 
and that a modernized and more nuanced disciplinary process is desirable and 
necessary.92 In the courtroom, judges could restrict some of the excesses of the 
adversary system. Examples might include modified procedures when aboriginal 
persons are involved93 or the curtailment of excessively adversarial tactics in cases 
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involving violence against women. 94 In the latter context, at a very minimum, judges 
could ensure that they and their peers stop blaming the victim. 95 On a different tack, 
judges could be more hospitable to malpractice suits brought against members of the 
legal profession. 96 
E. BENCHERS 
Benchers, as the embodied custodians of the conscience of the legal profession, have 
perhaps the greatest responsibility to go beyond the rhetoric of professional ethics, "to 
walk their talk. "97 The most significant opportunity and test for determining this 
possibility revolves around the question of self-regulation. As I interpret the evidence, 
it appears that self-regulation has not worked sufficiently well to satisfy public 
needs.98 Moreover, despite the fact that the law societies are (theoreticalJy) meant to 
protect "the public interest," that hardly appears to be the viewpoint of many of their 
members who, to the contrary, see law societies as protectors of the profession's 
parochial interests.99 Consequently, I would encourage benchers to consider "a system 
of multiple controls 11100 where justice is not only done but is manifestly seen to be 
done. Various options might include: review by judges, review by an ombudsperson, 
empowered lay representation, regulatory controls and greater openness to tortious, 
contractual and fiduciary actions. 101 In particular, assistance might be garnered from 
Quebec's Office des Professions.102 At an absolute m.inimum, as Wilkins points out, 
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benchers are representatives of the profession and therefore that the interests of the general public 
need to be protected by a system of checks and balances beyorid those of the internal regulatory 
mechanisms of the profession. See also Arthurs, supra note 7; Watson Hamilton, supra note 5 ;  
Pue, supra note 6. 
Wilkins, supra note 30. 
Anderson & Steele, supra note 96; American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of 
Disciplinary Enforcement, Lawyer Regulation for a New Century (Chicago: American Bar 
Association, 1992); Pue, supra note 6; Wilkins, ibid. Undoubtedly each of the suggested options 
has its own problems. It is beyond the scope of this paper to canvass their various strengths and 
weaknesses. My argument is that it is desirable to assess such possibilities rather than simply 
refusing point blank to contemplate any change in the status quo. 
Y.M. Morrissette, "Address on Alternative Visions of Legal Professionals in Society" (Address to 
A New Look: A National Conference on the Legal Profession and Ethics, Calgary IO  June 1994) 
[unpublished]. 
J 
NORMATIVE, AND SOMEWHERE TO GO? 941 
"enforcement proceedings should presumptively be open and accessible to ensure that 
information about the conduct in question and the standards being applied can be 
reviewed and critiqued." 103 
F. LEGISLATURES 
While there is much to be done within the profession, responsibility does not rest 
with the profession alone. In light of the failures of the legal marketplace, corrective 
interventions might well be required by the legislatures. For example, given the 
apparent intransigence of the profession on improved regulation, perhaps the time is 
ripe for the creation of autonomous review mechanisms for alleged misfeasances. 1 04 
Alternatively, steps could be taken towards curtailing the profession's monopoly over 
access to legal services. 105 More ambitiously, socialized law might be an appropriate 
approach, for example, through the fostering of prepaid legal services 106 and enhanced 
funding for legal aid.107 At a minimum, lawyers who do legal aid work ought to be 
promptly paid. 108 
G. SUMMARY 
To summarize, in this section I have attempted to develop two arguments. The first 
is that responsibility for the improvement of legal services lies primarily (but not 
exclusively) with those who are within the system, not with outsiders. Far too often 
IOJ 
I04 
IOS 
106 
I07 
I08 
Wilkins, supra note 30 at 884. 
Rhode, supra note 50 at 72 1 .  
A rather nice example of this intransigence occurred in my own law school as I worked on a 
final draft of this essay. Dalhousie has a first year course entitled "Orientation to Law" in which 
professors give 90 minute lectures on an area of particular interest to them. Students are 
subsequently interviewed by faculty members who quiz them on the various presentations made. 
To provide a common base for evaluation each professor provides several questions and suggested 
answers. A prominent member of the Nova Scotia Bar (who also attended this Conference) gave 
the lecture on Professional Responsibility, and provided the following questions and answers: 
1 .  What are the essential obligations of all Law Societies? 
[Answer: Admitting lawyers to the profession, setting standards for lawyers to follow, 
disciplining lawyers who get into trouble.] 
2. Why is it important that the legal profession remain independent? 
[Answer: Only a profession which is free from the threat of Government interference can 
fairly argue against the State and preserve the rights and privileges of individuals in the 
State.] 
3. In whose interest does the legal profession govern itself? 
[Answer: The primary goal of all Law Societies is to self govern the legal profession in 
the public interest.] 
For a powerful demolition of such doctrinaire arguments, see Pue, supra note 6. 
S imon, "Ideology," supra note 42 at 141 ;  S . Thom, "What to do about Paralegals" (March 1993) 
28 L. Soc. Gaz. 34; "N.S . Barristers' Society Sends Paralegals Stem Warning" Lawyers Weekly 
( 1 7  March 1989). 
R. Pearce, P. Shea & J. Stempel, "An Assessment of Alternative Strategies for Increasing Access 
to Legal Services" ( 1980) 90 Yale L.J. 122; E. Dennis, "Prepaid Legal Plan Gains Support: 
Lawyers Worried" [Halifax] Mail Star (2 September 1986) 7. 
Major, supra note 12. For a critique of legal aid, see Abel, supra note 7 at 1 13 1 -49. 
Curtis, supra note 5; Major, supra note 12. 
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power holders resist change by continually deferring responsibility to those who are 
excluded. This is the familiar "What's the problem? Prove it! Can you do it for us, 
please?" response. While we should not ignore what is being said by the communities 
which we serve and should do whatever is feasible to enhance their input, the processes 
of renewal and revision can (with just a little imagination and good will) be set in place 
immediately. My second proposition is that the time has now come to stop considering 
legal ethics as simply a "private" moral code internal to the profession and to 
reconceive them as enforceable "public" norms. A cloistered aristocracy is an 
anachronism in an egalitarian and democratic society. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By way of conclusion, I want return to the neologism of pessoptimism. The structure 
of my analysis and the substance of my comments have, in the main, emphasized the 
optimistic dimension of the equation. I have suggested that a serious pursuit of 
professional ethics requires reflection and reorientation pn many different fronts: on the 
micro level and the macro level, in the structure of the legal profession and in our 
individual characters. Rather than yearning for a mythical "golden age of 
professionalism," I have attempted to argue that we should be open-minded and forward 
looking in our planning. Conversations such as those generated by this conference 
signify that some progress is, perhaps, being made. 
But, at the same time, I think that it would be an error to get too starry-eyed by 
resting my report on idealistic voluntarism. I have two reservations: first, my sense of 
the inevitable tells me that debates about professional ethics are fine on a Saturday 
afternoon, but on Monday morning it will all seem very naive, or at best, something to 
be put on the back burner. As many participants (both optimistic and pessimistic) have 
pointed out, a major problem is that the provision of legal services is less about 
providing reflective and skilful advice, than it is ·about the selling of a commodity. 109 
Contemporary legal practice does not focus on the needs of a client; rather it focuses 
on time. Such an approach priorizes efficiency and wealth maximization over quality 
and care. The result is that many of us in the legal community suffer from a sort of 
double consciousness: on the one hand, we espouse the virtues of professionally 
responsible behaviour; yet, on the other hand, due to pressing practical demands, we 
have neither the time nor the energy to mobilize processes that would be conducive to 
fostering a more ethically responsible environment. In other words, the commodification 
of law renders our efforts demoralizing, 
Second, to emphasize and prioritize ethics is not cost-free. A regulated profession 
will be expensive; increased consumer remedies will drive up professional liability 
insurance costs to lawyers.1 1 0  The impact could be twofold. Lawyers might, in tum, 
reallocate such costs to consumers, making access to law even more expensive than it 
already is; or, small-time lawyers may be forced out of business, again making access 
109 Baker, supra note 38; Hunter, supra note 25; Major, supra note 12; MacKenzie, supra note 9. 
Arthurs, supra note 20; Curtis, supra note S; Laperriere, supra note 98. 
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that much more difficult. Such costs cannot be avoided by wishful thinking. 1 1 1  
However, an awareness of costs should not be raised as an insurmountable barrier to 
the possibility of enhanced professional responsibility. Rather, costs are but a variable 
that must be factored into the necessarily complex social equation. 
Finally, I want to suggest that pessoptimism counsels neither crude economic 
determinism 1 12 nor ahistorical sentimentalism. 1 13 It is not redemptive1 14 in its 
orientation, nor is it grounded in anti-professionalism.1 15 Rather, pessoptimism 
advocates a realistic and contextualized analysis which argues that lawtalk and legal 
practice are terrains of social, economic, political and moral contestation. Those of us 
who are engaged in the practices of law always and already (if inchoately) know this. 
It is through conferences such as this that we can bring these contestations to the fore 
in a struggle for professional reformation and realignment. The result, I would hope, 
is that even if we cannot agree how we can do more good, we might at least agree how 
we can do less harm. 
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